American Troops Leave Iraq With a Warning for Iran - Newsweek

Wednesday will witness the last American troops withdraw from Iraq, officially ending a two-decade-long military presence that began with an invasion in 2003 and resumed again in 2014 when U.S. forces returned to aid Baghdad in its fight against the Islamic State group.

Taken together with the somewhat abrupt pullout from Afghanistan five years ago, this closes a messy and complicated chapter in American history. A pair of so-called "forever wars,” waged at a great cost to the citizens of all countries—one that taught a lesson on the limits of what U.S. military power alone can achieve.

As the last plane out of Iraq takes off, two U.S. carrier strike groups are operating in the Arabian Sea in support of military operations against Iran, some seven months after Operation Epic Fury embroiled Washington in yet another highly complex foreign conflict.

Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003.

By April 9, American forces had taken Baghdad and overturned Saddam Hussein’s government. Saddam himself was captured before the year was out. Granted, the troops didn’t find those WMDs—no one can be expected to achieve the impossible!—but it looked as if America’s military might was to prevail once again.

If only it were so easy. By the time American combat troops finally left the shattered nation in 2011, 4,492 American soldiers lay dead, and almost 32,000 service members had been wounded in action. It’s a bleak toll, but one dwarfed by that of the Iraqis.

Conservative estimates of civilian deaths due to direct violence between 2003 and 2011 sit between 180,000 and 210,000, with hundreds of thousands more believed to have died indirectly as healthcare, vital infrastructure, and water sanitation collapsed. Operation Inherent Resolve, the later campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, saw another 123 U.S. military deaths, while Iraq said more than 26,000 of its soldiers and military personnel were killed during the four-year fight against the extremists.

Yet, with ISIS’ presence in the region mostly reduced to scattered sleeper cells, the current political and social climate looks far better in Iraq now than one would’ve expected during the darkest years of America’s occupation.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi told U.S. lawmakers in July that America is Baghdad’s "most important strategic partner." He also said, "After September 30, there will be no need for any armed factions,” assuring that Iraq’s federal forces could protect the country.

His second claim is already under strain.

Removing Saddam also removed a regime that had fought Iran through the brutal eight-year Iran-Iraq War. After 2003, Iraqi Shiite political movements with longstanding links to Tehran gained access to the new political system, while Iran armed, trained, and supported military groups based across the border. The collapse of Iraqi forces before ISIS in 2014 created another opening, as Iran-backed armed groups became central components of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that helped fight the extremists.

Al-Zaidi is therefore stuck trying to govern between two opposing forces. America’s gravitational pull is stronger, but Iran is much closer to home. His government wants American investment, security cooperation, and diplomatic backing, but the coalition that brought him to power includes Iran-allied Shiite parties, while several Iran-backed forces continue to operate on Iraqi soil.

Good relations with Washington can’t erase the political networks, armed groups and institutional footholds that give Tehran serious leverage inside Iraq. Twenty-three years, untold billions of dollars and tens of thousands of American casualties are a high price to pay for this rather precarious arrangement.

It's still much better than the one America left in Kabul. Two decades, many more billions of dollars and thousands of American lives were sunk there, too. The Taliban seized control of the capital before the final American soldier had even left Afghan airspace.

When President Donald Trump brought war to Iran on February 28 with Operation Epic Fury, he used a very different model.

No American occupation force followed the airstrikes. There was no Coalition Provisional Authority waiting in the wings to take control once the regime had been decapitated, and no attempt whatsoever at nation-building.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said Trump instead ordered his military to destroy Iran’s ballistic-missile and drone capabilities, its navy and the industrial base supporting its ability to project force. On April 8, after just 38 days of combat, Caine said the military had "achieved the military objectives as defined by the President.”

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was dead, along with several members of Iran’s political and military leadership. Washington also claimed Iran’s limited air force, navy, and much of its missile launch capabilities had been erased, along with large portions of its military-industrial base. The administration also insists Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon, having battered its nuclear facilities.

This account would suggest the White House has indeed learned from its rough experiences in the first two decades of this century. In reality, this is where the parallels begin to show.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, overwhelming American firepower produced spectacular results quickly—the hard part is turning that battlefield destruction into a long-term, beneficial political and military outcome.

It’s been nearly six months since the White House declared its core military objectives in Iran had been achieved. Yet, Tehran, for all it has suffered, continues to pose serious problems for Washington.

The Islamic Republic did not collapse with the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, even as Trump encouraged Iranians to rise and "take over” their government. His son and successor, Mojtaba, is an absent and impotent leader, experts told Newsweek, with hardline cadres within Iran’s security establishment having tightened their grip on power.

Meanwhile, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained; the cost of moving oil and fuel has soared, and America’s partners in the Gulf have been forced to endure the wrath of Iranian drones. No amount of American bombs or missiles has managed to solve these conundrums—or stop diesel from going above $6 a gallon.

Washington has avoided the occupation trap of Iraq and Afghanistan, but it’s yet to figure out a next step beyond military force that brings an acceptable return.

Tehran is now trying to put a price on the outcomes American military force has failed to secure.

The White House wants normal shipping through Hormuz, access for nuclear inspectors and guarantees over Tehran’s nuclear program. For Iran, the nuclear question is another matter entirely, but Tehran claims it is willing to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week—so long as Washington lifts its naval blockade of Iranian ports, waives sanctions on Iranian oil sales and agrees to a wider ceasefire. Neither side wants to blink first; both are paying for the impasse.

Trump insists Iran is bargaining from weakness. After rejecting Tehran’s latest proposal, he said the Iranians wanted an agreement because they were "losing so badly,” while trade intelligence firm Kpler estimates that around 10 million barrels of oil a day passed through Hormuz in September, as wider Gulf exports climbed to their highest level since the war began.

But the man who once delighted in telling Volodymyr Zelensky that he didn’t "have the cards” doesn’t have much of a hand of his own here, either.

The unity, outrage and desire to fight that characterized the months and years following 9/11 constitute an increasingly distant memory, but the costs of American interventionism and ill-conceived conflicts have been laid bare.

After George W. Bush’s speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he set out what became the war on terror, his approval rating hit 90 percent. A Gallup poll conducted the next month found 92 percent of Americans approved of the decision to launch airstrikes in Afghanistan. Days after the Iraq invasion began in 2003, 72 percent of Americans backed the second war.

This month, 64 percent of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of the situation with Iran, compared with 24 percent who approved, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted September 17 to September 20. The same poll put his overall approval rating at 32 percent, the lowest point recorded by Reuters/Ipsos across his two presidencies.

Congress is also trying to apply the brakes. On July 23, the House voted 214-208 to pass a War Powers resolution directing Trump to remove U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran. Last week, the Senate rejected it by the narrowest possible margin—49-50—but it seems Trump’s war is running on borrowed time. The House tried again on September 15, passing a second resolution by a wider 220-204 margin, which the Senate has yet to review.

The last U.S. troops are leaving Iraq 23 years after they first took Baghdad. The American people will not let the conflict in Iran drag on for that long, but their exit should serve as a warning of what can happen when the lessons of previous conflicts are ignored in the next.

Launching a war is easy. Finding a way out is much, much harder.