Map: Iran’s Ally Poised to Choke Additional 10 Percent of Oil Trade by Sea - Newsweek

A rapid offensive by the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement, also known as the Houthis, has put a powerful Iranian ally in control of the nation's Red Sea coast and, with it, another key maritime corridor at the mercy of the Axis of Resistance.

The Bab el-Mandeb lies between Yemen's southwest and the East African nation of Djibouti, constituting a link between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which ties to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. At its narrowest breadth, it's just 16 miles wide and Ansar Allah has a record of paralyzing global shipping from much farther away.

With Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces in retreat, a new blockade backed by the Ansar Allah's missiles and drones would interrupt the flow of roughly 8.1 million barrels per day of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products.

That's around 10 percent of global maritime oil trade, a figure made all the more strategically valuable by the Bab el-Mandeb's role as an alternative route since Iran moved to restrict shipping through the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint in response to the war launched on February 28 by the United States and Israel.

"If the Houthis consolidate control over Yemen's western coast and the approaches to the strait, this becomes much more than a Yemeni issue," Hisham al-Omeisy, a Yemeni analyst and former information resource center director at the U.S. Mission to Yemen, told Newsweek.

Omeisy emphasized that Ansar Allah's fighters do not necessarily even have to close the Bab el-Mandeb to make a difference. Rather, "they only need to make it dangerous enough that shipping companies decide the risk is too high," leading to "higher insurance costs, ships going around Africa, longer delivery times and ultimately higher prices."

"And this becomes particularly dangerous when you look at what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz," Omeisy said. "If Iran can put pressure on Hormuz while the Houthis threaten Bab el-Mandeb, you essentially have pressure on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula at the same time."

In addition to hosting 10 percent of global oil and 8 percent of global gas trade by sea, the Bab el-Mandeb also served as a gateway for some 30 percent of the world's container traffic before the war, according to Nitya Labh, academy associate fellow at Chatham House's International Security Program.

"Since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, countries like Saudi Arabia have diverted some of their oil exports from the Gulf to the Red Sea via overland gas pipelines, increasing the importance of the Red Sea in global energy markets," Labh told Newsweek.

But overland routes are not immune to the conflict, either. After reports emerged of attacks against Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline that runs from the eastern city of Abqaiq to the west coast port city of Yanbu, Riyadh confirmed Friday that damage had been inflicted by drones originating from Iraq, where other Iranian allies operate under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

The Red Sea crisis also threatens to choke off the Suez Canal, which Labh described as "the last viable shipping pathway through the Middle East region."

After Ansar Allah launched its initial campaign against Red Sea shipping in response to the October 2023 outbreak of the war in Gaza that precipitated the ongoing Middle East crisis, traffic through the vital waterway fell by more than two-thirds.

Most vessels were forced to take the far longer and costlier route toward South Africa's Cape of Good hope in a situation reminiscent of an era before the Suez Canal's founding in 1869. Transits slowly recovered upon a U.S.-backed ceasefire reached between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement in October 2025 and had hit their highest wartime level just last month.

Now that revival appears ill-fated and the impact looms for companies and consumers.

"Diverting trade through this longer route introduces a number of risks: traffic congestion around ports in the Mediterranean and the coast of Africa create major supply chain disruptions," Labh said. "New routes and changing traffic patterns create greater risk of piracy and accidents.

"They also add over 15 days and millions of dollars in fuel, insurance, and transport costs. These costs often get passed to consumers leading to higher rates of inflation globally. Some imports may become prohibitively costly, cutting off supplies completely. This is particularly impacting economies in small island states."

The impact may prove especially challenging for Saudi Arabia, already faced with the threats of attacks from Iran to the east, its Islamic Resistance in Iraq ally to the north and Ansar Allah to the south and west.

The Yemeni front poses a particularly potent risk as Ansar Allah digs in for an open conflict with the kingdom.

As Sanaa-based journalist Hussein Albukhaiti told Newsweek when Ansar Allah forces seized the key port city of Mokha on Thursday on their way toward Yemen's littoral Bab el-Mandeb shores, any intervention from Saudi Arabia, its traditional security partner, the U.S. or its Mecca Accord ally, Pakistan, would lead the group to "close the Red Sea for all the shipping belonging to these countries, either military or commercial."

"They could also block the entire Red Sea exactly as Iran did in the Persian Gulf, because the Red Sea is one of our main weapons," Albukhaiti said.

Albukhaiti warned that Ansar Allah's response to Saudi threats would not be limited to the sea.

He asserted that the group would "also launch a major attack against Saudi Arabia, not only targeting Aramco in some areas, but they might also target the entire infrastructure of Saudi Aramco and airport and ports, and also they might launch a ground attack against Saudi Arabia in Najran, Jizan and Asir as well" in a combined offensive with the potential to "damage and threaten the stability of Saudi Arabia."

Already, Ansar Allah has launched strikes against these southern Saudi cities and others, including attacks on energy infrastructure. The group has reported on Saudi warplanes launching airstrikes across western Yemen as well in recent days.

Saudi intervention in Yemen dates to 2015, when Ansar Allah, led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi, seized the capital and forces the country's government into exile. The Ansar Allah-aligned Supreme Political Council considers itself to be the legitimate head of state of Yemen, while the rival Presidential Leadership Council, headed by President Rashad al-Alimi, retains international recognition from its seat in the southern port city of Aden.

Prior to Yemen's current flare-up, the country's frontlines had been largely frozen since an April 2022 ceasefire backed by the United Nations. But as regional tensions boiled over amid the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which has fired missiles and drones on regional countries hosting U.S. military bases, including Saudi Arabia, Ansar Allah accused Riyadh of striking Sanaa International Airport in July, just as a group delegation was returning from Tehran.

Ansar Allah, which had already vowed just a month earlier to resume targeting Israeli access to the Red Sea, then threatened to cut Saudi access. And events since have shown the group was poised to make good on its rhetoric.

As for Saudi Arabia's local Yemeni allies, Omeisy said "a combination of factors" can explain the sudden collapse of their frontlines.

"The Houthis have been able to concentrate significant forces on key fronts and use drones and missiles more effectively, while government forces continue to struggle with coordination and unified command, as well as lack of aerial support," Omeisy said.

"Houthis have overwhelmed the government forces, and when one position falls or a unit withdraws, the Houthis have been very quick to exploit the gap."

Newsweek has reached out to representatives of Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia for comment.

The Yemeni government's defeat is far from guaranteed, however, and its forces have in the past been able to turn the tide with help from Riyadh.

In January, after suffering a swift takeover of territory by the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council, Yemeni government forces managed to retake Aden and other provinces in a Saudi-supported counteroffensive, leading to the dissolution of the southern separatist faction and the withdrawal of Emirati troops from the country.

Now facing not only the potential defeat of its ally but direct threats to the Kingdom and its energy trade, Omeisy warned the current situation "has serious implications for Saudi Arabia, regional security and global energy markets."

"It also reinforces something I think is increasingly important: supporting the Yemeni government in securing its Red Sea coast is no longer simply about Yemen's internal conflict," Omeisy said. "It is directly connected to freedom of navigation, energy security and the stability of global trade."

Ultimately, he said much would "depend on whether government forces can regroup quickly, establish new defensive lines and coordinate an effective counteroffensive."

But as reports emerge of a Saudi request for U.S. air support having been denied by President Donald Trump, who remains locked in a deepening conflict with Iran that has strained U.S. munitions stockpiles, Sherwan Hindreen Ali, Middle East manager at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) monitor, warned that "the Saudis simply do not have a lot of options right now, and they all carry risks for the kingdom."

"If the Saudis assess that both their economy and internal public opinion can sustain a prolonged conflict with the Houthis, they may decide to further escalate their military engagement and try to dislodge the Houthis from the Bab al-Mandeb and southern Red Sea coast," Ali told Newsweek. "This will inevitably lead to a sustained Houthi strike campaign on Saudi Arabia, especially its energy infrastructure."

"The Kingdom already faced this in the past, but Houthi weaponry is more sophisticated now than it was back then, and the Saudis likely have less interceptor missiles available as a result of the U.S.-Iran conflict—Ukrainian expertise could be useful there. The Saudis could also attempt to make advances against the Houthis and put pressure on them in their heartland of Sada in the north of the country or toward the capital Sanaa."

On the other hand, Ali argued that Riyadh could also "conclude that neither their economy nor internal public opinion can sustain a prolonged conflict with the Houthis, forcing them to finally make concessions to the group," particularly its demand to lift a blockade of Yemen.

Doing so, he argued, "will likely increase expertise and weapons transfers from Iran, considerably strengthening the Houthis in the long term," while also "leaving the Houthis in control of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb and the Saudis’ Yemeni allies in the lurch, presenting a lasting threat to global shipping."

And the growing strain felt by energy-vulnerable countries seeking de-escalation marks an advantage for Iran and its Yemeni ally.

"Ultimately, this means the Houthis and Iran can hold the world economy hostage to their individual conflicts," Labh said. "This leverage will matter at the negotiating table. Overtime, more countries outside of both conflicts will put pressure on countries like the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, etc. to bring an end to the war[s]."

Contact Newsweek editors on this story: Jason Lemon and Dave Siminoff.