Transforming global order - the wider debate

For two weeks we summed up the debate conducted by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) at the National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad under the annual 'International Programme for Development and Stability' regarding the 'Emerging Global Order (EGO)', strategic autonomy and stability, AI and technology, warfare and conflict prevention, and global competition. In the last plenary, Saudi and Turkish academics addressed the conference online. The Saudi scholar emphasised that security in the ME will be regionally decided only, when regional states acquire greater [hard power] capability. His formulation of Middle Power (MP) was a state able to generate influence beyond its borders, with bargaining leverage. He endorsed Pakistan's MP status through strategic flexibility, diplomatic balancing, techno-military proficiency and independence, regional partnerships, Islamabad's reach and position, etc – aspects he considered MP prerequisites. That Makkah Agreement combines unique MP capabilities of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye for greater regional influence. Prof Hussain of Türkiye described Ankara a changed MP, having lost an empire. That Türkiye, enjoying the luxury of its strategic location, uniquely belonged to Middle East, Europe, Central Asia and South Asia simultaneously, through geographic proximity and relationships, like with Pakistan, and alliances like Makkah Agreement, NATO membership and EU aspirations. He underscored the importance of Makkah Agreement in promoting collective security and strategic stability under an environment where the old order was dying, and EGO was yet to be fully operational. Prof Hussian pointed out that in any future regional security architecture, Ankara would emerge as a security provider; Türkiye believed in 'peace at home and peace abroad'; and Iran cannot be ignored. The three days of deliberations under the IPDS-26 covered a lot of ground and laid correct emphasis, where it belonged, i.e EGO and its implications for the world, the region and especially for Pakistan. It was hard to encapsulate all aspects of this expansive debate in the limited time. Before discussing EGO in the light of the raging academic debate, one would like to evaluate and suggest a sequel to the IPDS-26, to dilate upon EGO in the light of emerging global youth and a youth culture; the implications of lawless unilateralism by the US-Israel nexus in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; the role of ethics, religion and nationalism in shaping the EGO; the General-Politician debate (Generals misleading the politicians or other way round); the effects of AI proliferation on human intelligence and cognitive capacity; the worrying trend about acceptance of greater civilian losses in warfare, with non-contact warfare no more subservient to the logic of conscience (Israeli barbarism in Gaza and the US/Europe's complicit silence and numb acquiescence); long-term Pakistan-Iran ties, friend or foe; the ultimate American response to Iran under Trump presidency; and the emerging strategy of 'choke points' to include trade, financial and psychological choke points beyond the physical ones. Let's turn to academics of EGO. In one's reckoning, the outcome of the debate will largely hinge upon the outlook of the only hegemon, the US. The academic divide is among scholars on one side, who think the US displacement by China or an emerging multipolarity is a done deal and only a matter of time. For them China is not a 'rising power' but an already 'risen' and established one, buoyed by its vast human, financial, technological (including AI), military and emerging diplomatic capital and credentials. In this competition, under 'IR's Offensive Realism Theory' parlance, the US is on the decline, waiting to be displaced by China alone or through a multipolar world, that PRC would lead. These scholars cite the red carpet laid for President Xi during his recent US visit, with President Trump receiving him on the tarmac, in break with the US protocol; President Xi's demonstrated confidence, his talking points, and the nuances of negotiations with Trump and his Administration. The other group of academics do not consider the US in freefall. The current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine debates the 'end of alliances' under the US. In an essay by Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, the contemporary US perception is cited as a 'landlord seeking rent', a departure from its partnership credential with the Europe/World. Authors mention the prevalent sentiment in the US that 'alliance system'— America's biggest advantage over China – is unlikely to recover. However, in the writers' opinion, the US alliance system would survive and endure the Trump moment and Trump effect, which they consider transient. Because the alliance system has 'weathered now forgotten shocks'; that the main driver of the system, the West Plus threat perception remains unchanged (rather magnifies); and that there is due official diligence in the system to work 'for' and not 'against' the alliance system. They posit that Trump's perceived withdrawal, by default, makes the allies do more, so that the US can do less, and keep its reserves intact. Reducing reliance on Washington strengthens alliance's hard power, de-risks the US, and despite hedging by some Western powers, brings them together. People in 13 European countries polled that relationship with the US will get better after Trump steps down. Many hold the view that Russian defeat in Ukraine is essential for restraining Chinese ambition. And for that US support is critical, given the enormity of US 'fiscal scale' in AI, chip-making, cloud computing, etc, created by only three American 'hyperscalers', Amazon, Google and Microsoft, accounting for two-thirds of the global cloud market. The allies are undertaking the most significant defence buildup in a generation, funded by American capital. Europe has no alternative to threats it faces, other than America's space-based defence systems for surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, early warning and response. The Trump effect unites Europe and augments its defence. From the ongoing great power competition, the writers come up with five alternatives on 'multipolarity': a) Global multipolarity with no rules, no fixed alliances, and every state on its own; b) World divided into US and Chinese spheres of influence; c) a 'Great power concert' producing 'managed peace' among major powers; d) Partial Chinese preeminence given Beijing's sheer scale; the world deferring to Chinese mass, and: e) An Allied scale, balancing the Chinses scale. They reckon the last alternative, as plausible. The jury is out! Concluded…